I’ve mentioned determinacy a couple of times on this blog, especially in reference to computation, Cellular Automata and OOO. I think its worth explicating a couple of points in relation to determinacy. Indeed, from my own perspective its clear to see that the issue of transformation and topology will iron out some key differences, certaintly between Graham and Levi. Tim and Ian may, and probably have, offered their opinions on this at some point, either directly or indirectly. (I’ve probably missed Tim’s – as he posts about 5 points of intellectual direction a night and its hard to keep up).
Most of you who have read my posts and subsequent work, know that I have no time for an ontology of stochasticism. Unpredictability is an epistemological problem that fails to grasp discrete underlying executant rules. The infinity of algorithmic behaviour, intrinsic to itself, is, for me, all there is. The rules are thoroughly determined and fixed, and any random behaviour occurs as an encapsulated phenomenon, but an important one nonetheless (otherwise the aesthetics of algorithmic art would not be possible). This is not new in computer science, nor complexity theory, nor even the cognitive sciences (Free will is an illusion, etc).
As Ladyman and Ross mention in Every Thing Must Go (and herald it as an example of ‘real patterns’) Jon Conway’s Game of Life is an example of a deterministic system that sheds light on simulating emergence and evolutionary patterns and processes. (My own criticism of L&R, is that they place far too much emphasis on the output-patterns directly before them, rather than on the execution that gives birth to them – in short they place reality on the side of inputs and outputs, and not on the intrinsic execution itself.)
Hence, my view is anti-topological, and marks a distance away from Levi’s conception of what is an object (although I dare say we have similar views on contingency). Its bigger problem of how you account for agency. Levi holds that objects have a transformative power inherent in their virtual proper being, which can be teased out through indirect perturbations, this results as novel local manifestations.
Politically speaking, Levi has an important operational observation, if you push object x by perturbation y, you have a local manifestation output, emergent from the object itself. But I think ontology is more determined that this. Here’s Levi,
“we should not assume that entities only produce new local manifestations as a result of perturbations from the outside. We should hold open the possibility that there are many entities that can undergo all sorts of transformations at the level of local manifestations– all the way up to and including becoming new entities –through the result of their own internal dynamismssans external stimuli.”
The OOO part of Levi’s topology is the Luhmann inspired insight that, unitary structures and systems only interpret perturbations by the mechanism inherent to their functioning. Someone who is anxious about losing their hair will inevitably be perturbed by the contingent interactions of people with a full head of hair. Presumably a financial corporation would interpret contingent perturbations, only where money is lost, not human suffering, localist issues or ecological catastrophes.
And heres my key difference; I hold no such concept of topological transformation, but determinate parameters. Its actually anti-Meillassouxian more than anything else. Algorithms can be contingent but not always; more specifically algorithms can be contingent on other algorithms. There is no ‘in-itself contingency’, but rather contingency is an actualised forceful procedure that either halts algorithms and/or changes their inputs and rules. This is the crux; if you perturb a procedure (like, turning off, shutting a computer down), does that make the procedure non-determinable?
Just because you can halt the algorithm’s functioning, this does not make it random. Rules are rigid because they are rules. If you want to change the behaviour you change the rules or the starting inputs. If you have changed the rules, then you have constructed a brand new executant procedure which is always static and fixed, and intrinsic to those set of procedures. If you change the starting conditions, then you have not changed the executant algorithm as such, you have merely changed its starting conditions.
5 Comments
I’m not sure that there’s as much of a difference as you suggest here. All I’m pointing out is that there can be transfermations that don’t result from external perturbations from the outside. Objects are, in and of themselves, dynamic systems or cellular automata. Some have unfolding process that can pead to new local manifestations. That’s different than suggesting that those changes are freely chosen. That said, I’m not entirely sure where I stand on the issue of freedom.
Hi Levi,
Well it’s a work in progress, and as such nothing is final. Indeed there may not be a difference, and I find it extremely interesting that for you objects are in of themselves dynamic systems.
The difference I was alluding to is that i’m conceptualising the execution of these algorithmic systems as the object in and of itself. And the execution is determinate, rigid, with set rules and set parameters, and I can’t see any movement in linking it into topology (in short – topology does not define algorithmic procedures, but quite the opposite, algorithmic calculations are used to simulate topological models.) Bending and flexing strict rules is not part of execution. It executes or does not, and if those rules are changed and/or repeated from different inputs – this can produce topological phenomena.
The problem I have is squaring off this executant determinacy of procedures with the fact that they can be stopped. They aren not absolutely determined. Your OOO position and everyone else’s positions have provided (and still continue to provide) some excellent questions here, on how to formulate this problem.
As you and Graham note; the issue of freedom in OOO is a tricky one. Whether withdrawn in the virtual or actual realm, we all agree that units are autonomous from us and each other. But does autonomy equal freedom?
Robert,
That’s an interesting conception you have of topology. What topologists study are the rules of transformation for variations in a form. I’m unclear as to how this would be at odds with what you’re talking about. It sounds as if you’re characterizing toplogy as the investigation of amorphous blogs that have no structure whatsoever.
Setting ontological issues aside, I think that insurmountable epistemological problems arise if the universe is strictly deterministic. The ability to evaluate arguments, explore reasons, persuade and be persuaded, etc, seems to require free will. This has been coming up a lot lately as I work through my students with Spinoza and why I’m hesitant about strict determinisms.
True enough – but one of the interesting outcomes of Wolfram’s NKS is the argument that although free will is often aligned with unpredictability and randomness, it can still be subject to underlying determined rules. Wolfram never really builds on this other than “I think I’ve solved the determinism vs. free will problem and heres 100 half-baked words relevant to CA and science to explain why” I think more needs to be written on this issue, but basically the idea is that free will is an encapsulation of ourselves as irreducible execution. Because our (and other object’s) executant Being is irreducible, we cannot even know how, we ourselves will determine ourselves. Like most insights – its paradoxical.
“they place reality on the side of inputs and outputs, and not on the intrinsic execution itself”
That’s well put Rob. I’ll think on this some more.
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